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Notes
The Dilemma of Federal Impact Area School Aid
I. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II the United States Government has built
and staffed scores of bases and installations throughout the
United States. The effects produced by these bases on their re-
spective local communities have been as profound as they are
varied. One such effect is that upon the local public school
system. Real property, which previously had produced tax reve-
nue to pay for the local educational system, was put beyond the
reach of the local taxing authority. Simultaneously the obliga-
tions and costs of the school system were dramatically increased
by the influx of children whose parents were employed or re-
sided, or both, on the federal installation.'
Congress sought to alleviate this double burden with the
passage of PL 81-8742 in 1950, whereby federal funds were made
available to affected local school districts according to a statutory
formula which accounted for lost property tax revenues and the
per pupil cost of educating the extra "federal" children.3 At the
same time, however, the school aid formulae of several states
had already automatically begun meeting the costs of increased
enrollments, and making up for the sharply reduced local finan-
cial capabilities, through increased state disbursements to local
school districts. Such state school aid statutes were in most in-
stances equalization plans, expressing the state policy that no
student in a public school should receive a substandard education
for want of adequate financing in his school district. In pursuit
of this policy, the state, by one device or another, guaranteed a
minimum per pupil dollar expenditure. The difference by which
the revenues of a particular district fell short of the guaranteed
minimum would then be made up by the state out of its general
revenue.
Local taxes, of course, were almost invariably levied on
real property within the district. Thus, when a district's tax
base was reduced and the number of children in its school system
increased by a federal installation and staff, the state's equaliza-
tion formula automatically operated to restore the district's fi-
1. S. REP. No. 2458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-40 (1964).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 237-38 (1964).
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nancial capability, to the extent that the local authorities were
unable to meet the state established minimum per pupil expendi-
ture. The net result was that some of the affected local districts
enjoyed a nearly double recovery of their total burden attribut-
able to the federal presence-once from the state and once from
PL 874. Some states sought to minimize the overlapping of fed-
eral and state aid by providing that an amount equal to a fixed
percentage of the aid received by a federally impacted local school
district under PL 874 would be deducted from the district's gross
entitlement under the state's school aid formula..4
Beginning in February, 1968, a series of taxpayer suits in
federal district courts have challenged these state deduction pro-
visions on the ground that they frustrated the congressional in-
tent to aid the affected school districts and were consequently
void under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.5 Each
case has held for the taxpayer-plaintiffs. The holding of the
first case was written into PL 8746 by the 90th Congress in 1968.
States are now statutorily barred from deducting PL 874 aid
from their own allocations to affected local school districts at the
risk of having PL 874 aid cut off altogether for non-compliance.
The purpose of this Note will be to investigate the factual,
legal and constitutional bases of these judicial and legislative
decisions to determine whether they require the outcome which
was reached. It will inquire into the implications of that result,
both in terms of the actual effect on local school districts and
with respect to basic constitutional doctrines. Particular atten-
tion will be given to the apparent misconstruction of the nature
of the state deduction formulae and their interaction with the
federal law.7
4. E.g., Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 719, item 459(b) (6) (1966).
5. Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1963); Her-
genreter v. Hayden, 295 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1968); Douglas Independent
Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849 (D. S.D. 1968); Carlsbad
Union Sch. Dist. of San Diego County v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434
(S.D. Cal. 1969); Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Neb. 1969).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 240(d) (2) (Supp. 1969).
7. The terms "impacted school district" and "federal children"
will appear throughout. Impacted school districts are those whose stu-
dent populations have been substantially enlarged by the attendance of
children of federal employees, and at the same time have lost local tax
revenues formerly used by the local school system due to the acquisi-
tion of real property by the federal government. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1964).
Federal children are those enrolled in the local school system
whose parents reside or work, or both, on federal property within the




There have been five cases to date which have reached
identical results on the issue of state deduction of PL 874 aid,8
largely because the latter cases substantially duplicate the first.
Consequently, discussion of the issues will be confined to the
first case.
A. SnEPHEARD v. GODWIN 9
Under Virginia law all public school districts were required
to spend a minimum amount of money each year for schools
computed under a formula reflecting the number of teachers em-
ployed and the number of children attending school in the dis-
trict.10 To help defray the cost of this required minimum educa-
tion program, the state made two contributions of education aid
funds-a basic share and a supplemental share. The basic share
equalled 60 percent of the cost of teachers' salaries.1 1 The
supplemental share consisted of whatever further amount was
necessary to make up the district's mandatory minimum expend-
iture, but only after crediting the district with its revenues from
the basic share, the local property tax and a fixed percentage of
the funds receivable under PL 874.12
The purpose of the supplemental share was to equalize the
educational opportunities of all children by making up the dif-
ference between the local district's own revenue and the amount
required to be spent per pupil. Where, for example, the federal
government built a naval base or a V.A. hospital, thereby ren-
dering a large amount of land untaxable, and the district's schools
took in the children of the installation's staff, the district's tax
revenues would become insufficient to meet the mandatory per
pupil expenditure. The state statute automatically covered the
difference. But, more or less, so did the federal payments under
PL 874. Thus, if the state required a per pupil expenditure of
$500, but local income, in the face of a qualifying federal "im-
pact," amounted only to $350 per pupil, the district would receive
the missing $150 from the state. But the district would also re-
ceive a grant under PL 874 which approximated the whole cost
8. See note 5 supra.
9. 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
10. Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 719, item 459 (c) (5) (1986).
11. Id.
12. 280 F. Supp. at 873. At one time the percentage deducted was
100, but in the contested school year it was 50 percent and at the time
of trial it had been reduced to 33 percent.
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of educating the federal children. To a certain extent, this
overlapping constituted a windfall to the impacted district.
Consequently, the state reduced its supplemental aid by an
amount equal to an established fraction of the amount to be re-
ceived by the impacted local district under PL 874.
The plaintiffs argued that the deduction by the state bur-
dened them as property taxpayers and to that extent directly
contravened the intended effect of PL 874 in violation of the
supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution. The plaintiffs
also complained that the impacted local district was receiving
less money overall under the Virginia deduction formula than
it was meant to receive under PL 874, and that the difference
being recovered by the state of Virginia 13 amounted to a diver-
sion of PL 874 aid from the impacted district to the state, again
in direct contravention of clear congressional intent.14
Virginia argued, in support of the reduction of state aid, that
the state supplemental formula, aside from any federal aid, ac-
counted for both the extra children and lost property taxes of
the impacted district. Consequently, when federal aid directed
to the same objective became available to the impacted district
it was not unreasonable or unlawful for the state to reduce pro-
portionately a corresponding part of its aid. This reduction of
aid also furthered the underlying state policy of providing all
children an equal educational opportunity through nearly equal
per pupil dollar expenditures in all districts. To allow such dis-
tricts to recover both state and federal aid directed to impact
burdens would clearly violate this state policy.15
The court accepted both of the plaintiffs' arguments. It
found that any deduction by the state pro tanto burdened plain-
tiffs as taxpayers, since it was assumed that the reduction of
state aid left unalleviated part of the impact burden. This pre-
sumably then would have to be made up by local taxpayers. The
court also found the purpose of the federal act to be that of
"supplementing" local revenue, as opposed to replacing lost taxes.
This finding was based on the court's assumption that the fed-
eral contribution under PL 874 was less than the property taxes
which the federal property would have produced'0 and on its in-
terpretation of certain language in the legislative history of the
act. Having reached those conclusions, it was only a short step
13. Virginia was saving about ten million dollars annually.
14. 280 F. Supp. at 873-74.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 872-73.
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to the further decision that Virginia could not diminish the ef-
fect or amount of federal aid received by impacted school dis-
tricts without violating the supremacy clause. Specifically, the
court found the Virginia deduction formula to have three ef-
fects, each prohibited by PL 874: (1) local taxpayers were rebur-
dened with a portion of unindemnified impact costs, (2) students
in the local schools were threatened again with insufficient fa-
cilities and programs due to reduced amounts of available school
funds and (3) the state was enjoying the benefits of approxi-
mately $10,000,000 of federal money which PL 874 intended to
go directly to the impacted school district.17
The state was therefore permanently enjoined from taking
into account funds receivable by local school districts deter-
mining the eligibility of or amount to be received by local dis-
tricts from the state. The result of the holding was effectively
to preclude any attempt by Virginia to reduce the state response
to the plight of impacted districts in any manner keyed to the
federal response to the same problem.
In each of the four subsequent cases the purpose and effect
of the state aid statute was the same-to equalize the per pupil
dollar expenditures at a guaranteed minimum level in all the
school districts of the state. The later decisions did extend
Shepheard to the extent that they held the state deductions im-
permissible regardless of the state's purpose therein, and regard-
less of the subsequent use of the withheld state funds.18
EII. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
A. INTRODUCTION
Each court which has considered the issues under discussion
has cast its decision in terms of the supremacy clause of the
Federal Constitution 9 by which the asserted conflict between
state and federal legislation is resolved in favor of the superior
federal law. The supremacy clause is therefore a convenient
framework within which to analyze the cases and is an equally
useful device for approaching the legislative history and op-
erative effect of PL 874. Consequently, the court's doctrinal
usage of the supremacy clause will be analyzed and then used as
a structural device for further analysis of the Shepheard case.
A state law challenged under the supremacy clause has been
17. Id. at 874.
18. 295 F. Supp. at 852-54; 293 F. Supp. at 849-51.
19. U.S. CoxsT. art. VI, cl 2.
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held to bear, as does a state enactment challenged under any
other constitutional provision, an initial presumption of consti-
tutionality which must be overcome by the challenger. 20  When
the challenge arises out of an alleged conflict between state and
federal acts, the supremacy clause operates to invalidate the con-
stitutionally lesser state law only if
a) Congress has expressly pre-empted the field, leaving no
room in which the state's concurrent power may operate; 21
or
b) there is a demonstrable conflict between the two acts in
their operation, either in the actual results thereof or in
their respective purposes and policies. 22
In other words, the supremacy clause can operate in two circum-
stances. The first is in the narrow situation where the Con-
gress has within the scope of its constitutional power expressly
pre-empted the subject of the legislation. These issues are ordi-
narily quite easily solved given the above two conditions. The
other situation is broader and under the term "operational con-
flict" may be characterized as a sort of implied pre-emption.
Where a state law conflicts in a substantial manner with an other-
wise valid federal act, the former must fall. Here, however, the
question is not so easily answered. Difficult issues of interpre-
tation of legislative intent, and the question of whether there is
in fact any conflict, must be resolved. In any event, the state
law is not to be declared unconstitutional under the supremacy
clause except upon an examination of the particular facts of each
case since it is important not to strike down a state law unless
a clear case of pre-emption or a genuine conflict or impermissible
overlapping of the laws is demonstrated.2 3
The argument made by plaintiffs in each of the five cases
mentioned above was principally based on the operational con-
flict theory, that the state law operated directly to deprive
them of a benefit expressly conferred by the act of Congress.
Each court adopted this argument as a factual conclusion. But
20. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
21. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (test
is congressional intent which may be manifested in any of several ways)
and cases cited; see also McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. Hill v. Fla., 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (effect of enforcement of state
act was to limit a federally created right); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663(1962) (state community property law cannot frustrate a federally cre-
ated property right); Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261,
275 (1943) (state regulation which only increased milk prices did not so
conflict with a federal act as to be unconstitutional, absent express con-
gressional statement).
23. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
[Vol. 55:33
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each court also turned to the first doctrine, that of congressional
pre-emption, for the legal basis of its respective holding. The
Shepheard court read the language of PL 874 as itself intending
to preclude any state involvement whatsoever in the disburse-
ment of the federal aid. In each case the court expressed this
conclusion directly after a statement of the arguments of the par-
ties without any explicit consideration of the underlying facts or
of the court's intermediate reasoning. So founded, the conclusion
is something less than persuasive.
B. SuPREmAcY CLAUSE DocTRNE
Ordinarily a finding of statutory pre-emption, in the narrow
sense, within the ambit of the supremacy clause has required
proof of three elements: 24
i) Congressional competence to pre-empt,
ii) Congress' manifest intent to pre-empt, 25 and
iii) actual overlapping of the two legislative enactments, irre-
spective of any actual hostility between the two.
The constitutional power of the Congress to pre-empt the treat-
ment of impact-associated burdens may reasonably be conceded
on such a narrow point as that presented. The area would
seem to lie in the middle of the spectrum of concurrent power
since regulation of school affairs is certainly within the retained
police power of the states, while administration, regulation and
protection of federal aid programs, regardless of the beneficiary,
is equally clearly within the supreme power of Congress.20
Thus, were power the only test, it is most likely that once
Congress expressly chose to regulate this narrow area, the states
would be forbidden to interfere with that regulation in any way
whatsoever.2 7 But power is not the only consideration. The most
important consideration, particularly in areas of concurrent
power, has been held to be that of intent. Past decisions consist-
ently have held that before a pre-emption is to be found, invali-
dating an otherwise valid state law, the Congress must have
24. Southern Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
25. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
26. But cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 20 F. Supp. 940 (1937)
(commerce power may supersede state use or property tax authority).
Compare in this context the situation under the commerce clause where
Congress' power to pre-empt regulation of interstate commerce is indis-
putable (Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)), with any of the
reserved powers of the states to regulate their internal affairs without
federal legislativeinterference.
27. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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manifested a clear and definite intention to pre-empt.2 8 The best
evidence of this intent, of course, is an express statement. Short
of that, however, the Supreme Court has found statutory pre-
emption where "that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress. '29 However, if the intent to pre-empt is not clear on the
face of the act, the courts are loathe to imply it. In fact the
Court has held that such an intent is not to be inferred "where
the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains
ambiguous. '30
C. APPLICATION OF SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOCTRINE TO PL 874
PL 874 on its face is silent on the pre-emption issue-there is
no express statement and the argument is at best dubious that
the scheme of the act is so pervasive and exclusive as to preclude
all state action on the same subject. The pre-emption issue de-
veloped in the cases in the form of a controversy over what
word accurately characterized the nature of the aid given by
PL 874. The Shepheard court found that the scheme of PL 874
was to "supplement" and not to "substitute." The choice of a
word here was crucial since to the court each word carried its
own contrary and controlling implication. "Supplement" sug-
gested that the function of the aid was to bestow extraordinary
benefit over and above the revenue available from all other
sources. If this were the nature of the aid, any withdrawal of
state aid keyed to the federal aid clearly diminished the effect
and purpose of the federal aid. "Substitute," on the other hand,
carried the notion that the nature of the aid was compensatory
and restitutional. In that context state deduction of state aid
is immaterial to the federal program provided the impacted
district is still compensated and restored to its previous financial
balance. 31
However, this definitional approach to determine the pre-
emption issue is misleading and simplistic. The two words
28. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); McCul-
loch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The
Court continued:
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme
of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it .... Or the state policy may produce a result in-
consistent with the objective of the federal statute.
Id.
30. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943).
31. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
[Vol. 55:33
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around which the court weaves the fabric of its reasoning refer
not to policies but to mechanics-the mere methodology by
which an underlying policy or congressional intention is to be
effectuated. Whether the inquiry be related to a question of
silent pre-emptive intent or one of conflict of laws, it must focus
upon that federal policy. Only an unequivocal ascertainment
of the policy behind the federal statute will serve to answer
the basic issues arising under the supremacy clause. This failure
of the court to interpret the federal policy correctly is the source
of its inability accurately to compare the federal and state pro-
grams and their harmonious interaction.
The inquiry, then, will henceforth be directed towards as-
certaining what the federal policy actually was. Only then may
it be decided whether there has indeed been either a pre-emption
of the field or a conflict between state and federal law. Never-
theless, the discussion often must be framed in terms of the
court's chosen "supplement/substitute" vocabulary in order to
demonstrate that even on that level the conclusion reached is
fundamentally untenable.
Perusual of the text of PL 874 will show no language to sup-
port the conclusion that the statutory scheme is one of "supple-
mentation." Nor will the scheme of the act disclose the per-
vasive regulatory effect necessary to justify an inference of
statutory pre-emption. At no time will the federal statute or any
element of its history demonstrate any congressional policy
which would conflict with a state program whose policy was
equalization of dollar inputs into each school district. Indeed,
it will appear that this was also the very intent of the Congress
when it enacted PL 874.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE STATUTE3 2
The legislative scheme and intendment are spelled out in
the act itself, PL 81-874.33 Section 236 provides that the policy
of the United States is "to provide financial assistance . . . for
those local educational agencies upon which the United States
has placed financial burdens by . . .": a) loss of taxable real
property to federal ownership; b) enrollment of children whose
parents reside and are employed on such federally owned prop-
32. PL 874 was codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-40 (1964). The section
references hereinafter will be to the Code sections.
33. 64 Stat. 1100 (1950).
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erty; and c) enrollment of children whose parents are employed
on such federally owned property.
Section 237 directs the United States Commissioner of Edu-
cation to determine (1) those local school districts in which the
federal government has since 1938 acquired ten percent or more
of the previously taxable real property, (2) whether such a dis-
trict is financially handicapped thereby and (3) whether the dis-
trict is otherwise being compensated therefore by other federal
aid or payments in lieu of taxes or by secondary economic bene-
fits profiting the local educational agency. If the district quali-
fies as an impacted district under this definition, and is not
otherwise being compensated through any of the specified fed-
eral payments, the district is entitled to compensatory federal aid,
the amount thereof not to exceed the taxes that the occupied
land would have paid if held in private hands.
Section 238 contains the formula by which the entitlement of
an impacted school district is computed. For this purpose, two
categories of children are defined:
(a) those whose parents reside and are employed on federally
owned land; 34 and
(b) those whose parents reside elsewhere in the district and
are employed on federally owned property.35
The formula consists of the multiplication of the local district's
previous annual per pupil expenditure by the number of type
"(a)" children and one half the number of type "(b)" children.3"
The federally owned property must lie within the district seek-
ing to qualify.
Section 238 also specifies another minimum requirement for
entitlement to PL 874 aid. The total number of federal children
in the district must exceed ten and the lesser of three percent of
the children in average daily attendance in the district, or 400
children. Section 238 further provides that should the payment
computed under section 237 be insufficient to provide an educa-
tional level in terms of per pupil expenditure equal to that of a
group of generally comparable but non-impacted local school dis-
tricts in the same state, the Commissioner of Education may in
his discretion increase the amount of aid available to the im-
pacted district. The increased amount is not to exceed the aver-
34. 20 U.S.C. § 238(a) (1964).
35. 20 U.S.C. § 238(b) (1964).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 238(c) (1964). The first figure is the local contribu-
tion rate (LCR), and is the figure representing the impacted district's aver-
age per pupil expenditure in the second preceding year. The formula may
be represented as follows: LCR(a- b).
[Vol. 55:33
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age per pupil expenditure of the group of comparable districts.
Moreover, the Commissioner must determine that
a) the impacted local district is making a bona fide effort to
raise revenue locally, and
b) fifty percent of the children in average daily attendance
in the impacted district are residents of federally owned
property, and
c) state compensation, adequate or not, is available to the
local district without discrimination with respect to the fed-
eral children.
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The statutory language and scheme provide no support for
the conclusions of the court. Thus, the court turned to the
legislative history which consisted of the committee reports ac-
companying the act.
It was discussed earlier 37 how the Shepheard court felt that
the particular word chosen to characterize the nature of PL 874
aid would carry controlling implications with respect to the
supremacy clause issue. The choice of such a word was
prompted by Virginia's second major argument that section 237
spelled out the nature of the aid allocated by section 238, and
that that nature was essentially to replace lost local property
tax revenue with federal aid dollars.38 The court flatly rejected
this argument. It asserted that Virginia had misapprehended
the nature and effect of PL 874 aid, which the court concluded,
was intended to "supplement" local revenues and not to "substi-
tute" for lost revenues.39
Unfortunately, the Shepheard court never returned to
this point to explain exactly where in the act or in the legislative
history it found language to suggest that PL 874 aid was meant
not to replace lost local revenues but rather to supplement what-
ever local revenues there were.40  Nor does the court state the
source of any inference to that conclusion. The court failed to
address itself to the more material and relevant question of
whether the congressional policy behind PL 874 comprehended
a preclusion of all state regulation in the area.
37. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
38. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 237-38 (1964).
39. This theme was that seized upon by both the Kansas and
South Dakota courts as the primary source of conflict between PL 874
and the respective state aid formulae.
40. See 280 F. Supp. at 872.
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1. Intention Under The Statute4'
The act and the materials of its legislative history prior to
the 1968 amendment 42 uniformly manifest the intent that fed-
eral funds are meant to substitute at the local level for the prop-
erty tax revenues lost when the federal government acquired
land, and at the same time to help pay the expenses incurred in
providing facilities and instruction for large numbers of federal
children. To suggest otherwise, that this aid is to "supplement"
local revenues, is to suggest that the policy of the act was to
provide bonus or extra income to be added on top of the impacted
district's gross revenue from all other sources. In fact, as will
appear below, the policy of the act must have been one of resto-
ration of the equality of dollar inputs to their pre-impact per
pupil levels. The policy which the court rather obliquely im-
putes to Congress is one of requiring the state to continue in
full its augmented aid while at the same time granting a large
amount of federal aid over and above the state aid and of com-
pelling this extraordinary largesse only to impacted districts.
The court's conclusion is refuted by the mechanism of the fed-
eral aid formula, as well as by express language and obvious in-
ferences in the rest of the act and the other elements of the legis-
lative history.
The formula in section 238 which allocates PL 874 funds is
controlled by the number of federal children in the impacted
district and by a per pupil figure equal to the average per pupil
expenditure of a group of comparable non-impacted districts.
With respect to the latter limit, the Senate committee report said
that the intention was that the groupings should be so arranged
that as far as possible no impacted district would receive more
per pupil than the prevailing per pupil allocation in comparable
non-impacted districts. 43 The object was to restore equality be-
tween impacted and non-impacted districts and to prevent over-
payment to the former, measured by the comparable non-im-
pacted districts. This statement in the report tends to negate
any inference that the nature of the aid is supplementary as op-
posed to compensatory, or that the policy was anything but the
restoration of financial equality, as opposed to the bestowal of an
arbitrary and extraordinary grant. In fact, the average figure
for the group of non-impacted districts is the upper limit to the
41. Compare PL 89-750, 80 Stat. 1211 (1966).
42. See section B of part V infra.
43. S. REP. No. 1674, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).
[Vol. 55:33
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per pupil aid an impacted educational agency may receive,1
again suggesting a purpose of restoring impacted districts to a
position of relative financial balance and equality, rather than
as the court implies, simple supplementation of local revenue.
Similarly, section 237 provides a basic upper limit to a local
district's entitlement under PL 874 of the amount of property
tax revenue which would have been generated by the federally
owned land if it were in private hands. Clearly the implication
from this is that the purpose of PL 874 dollars is to replace the
tax revenues lost by providing funds up to but not exceeding
the amount lost due to the federal presence. No more here than
in section 238 can it be inferred that the congressional purpose
was blindly to provide aid over and above the amount available
to the impacted district prior to the federal contribution.
Section 236 which contains the declaration of policy and
objective of PL 874 is at best ambiguous on the issue of "sub-
stitute" or "supplement." It contains the statement that the
policy of the United States is "to provide financial assistance...
for those local educational agencies upon which the United States
has placed financial burdens. . .. ,4" Support for the view of the
Shepheard court can be found here if one were to read "financial
assistance" for burdens imposed as meaning supplementing, or
adding on top of, local revenues in opposition to and to the exclu-
sion of the idea of replacing lost revenues. This reading obviously
is not compelled by the context of the section, nor is it even a par-
ticularly reasonable reading of what surely was meant to be quite
general language. At any rate, it cannot be said that any lan-
guage in sections 236 through 238 constitutes a "clear and mani-
fest" expression of intention by Congress to pre-empt the subject
of this legislation.
Moreover, in certain other federal aid to education programs,
particularly the compensatory education program, where the
purpose was avowedly one of bestowing unequal supplementary
grants, the Congress was able to make quite plain what its intent
was.46 It has made no comparable statement here.
2. The Committee Reports
Ordinarily, statutory purpose is to be gleaned from the face
of the statute alone. Where, however, that source is silent, the
44. 20 U.S.C. § 238(c) (1964).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1964).
46. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Amend-
ments, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966) and 81 Stat. 783 (1968).
1970]
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Supreme Court has held it permissible to go behind the act to
its legislative history to inquire further into both the implica-
tions of the act and the intentions of Congress. 47 The necessity
of this step arises from the silence of the statute itself with re-
spect to the issue of pre-emption-it is insufficient merely to point
to that silence as impeaching the court. Affirmative evidence
must be adduced in order to create a persuasive argument. Set
out below are excerpts from the Senate report accompanying the
bill which became PL 874. The Committee wrote:
This section [237] provides that the Federal Government shall
pay to each local educational agency which furnishes education
to children residing on Federal property an amount per child
roughly equivalent to the amount per child which other property
owners in comparable communities pay toward the cost of edu-
cating children....
The payment per child residing on Federal property-i.e., the
local contribution rate-is an amount equal to the current ex-
penditures per child made from revenues from local sources in
comparable school districts within the State....
The effect of the payments provided for in this section is to
compensate the local educational agency for loss in its local
revenues.
48
The Committee that approved the initial bill evidently
thought that it was passing an act which would provide to im-
pacted school districts the difference between their prior finan-
cial position and their post-impact financial dilemma. The Com-
mittee's language is not that which one would expect to
find used to express the desire to bestow a grant purely over and
above the impacted district's total income from other sources.
The language of the corresponding House Committee report is
substantially identical, and suggests the same conclusion.
3. Prior Legislation
This conclusion is further strengthened by reference to two
of PL 874's predecessors. PL 77-45249 authorized the Federal
Works Administrator to pay funds to "local school agencies re-
quiring assistance that may be subject to a loss of tax revenues
because of the acquisition or ownership of land by the Federal
Government."" ° Similarly, an Act of October 14, 1940,"' required
managers of federal housing projects whose properties were ex-
empt from local taxation to pay to the local educational agency
47. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
48. S. R'P. No. 2458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
49. 60 Stat. 314 (1946).
50. Id.
51. 54 Stat. 1125 (1940), 42 U.S.C. § 1546.
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an amount in lieu of taxes equivalent to the tax paid by similar
property in comparable school districts. The purpose of the
latter act was held to be to "equalize tax treatment between the




Each of the above acts was designed to provide compensation
to school districts in proportion to the financial burden imposed
by federal ownership of property in the district, and to produce
as a subsidiary effect the equalization of tax burdens on local
private property so that property owners did not have to pay
drastically increased taxes to make up for the lost revenues.
PL 874 logically and functionally follows these acts, duplicating
both their purpose and effect.
4. Summary
This section began with this question: Did Congress mani-
fest an intent, clearly or otherwise, to pre-empt this legis-
lative area with respect to state programs of the kind involved
in Shepheard? In other words, was it the intent of Congress to
bestow supplemental revenue over and above an impacted dis-
trict's other income, or was its intent to provide funds spe-
cifically designed to cover particular losses and extraordinary
costs? The answer to the second question, which PL 874 and the
materials in its legislative history disclose to be the coverage of
specific costs imposed on impacted districts, answers the first
question in the negative. In the context of the particular state
statute, its effect, and the rather clearly defined intendment of
the federal act, the answer should have been "no": there was
no congressional intent to preclude states from deducting in sub-
stance only their own increased aid when the need for it
vanished:
C. OPERATIONAL CONFl ICT
Since there is no legislative pre-emption inherent in the fed-
eral act with respect to the particular state action challenged in
Shepheard, the only other reason the state act might run afoul
of the supremacy clause is if it were shown to conflict in its
operation with either the overall policy or the specific effect of
the federal law.
52. New Castle v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 59 (D. Del. 1958).
1970]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
1. Purpose and Operation of the Acts
(a) Virginia Law
One of Virginia's arguments in Shepheard was that since
PL 874 paid the per capita cost of educating federal children, ac-
cording to the formula of section 238, it was only reasonable that
the state be allowed to withdraw from its aid allocation the
identical state payments for the same children. To this the court
replied that states had no business diverting PL 874 funds to
themselves, since the federal children were paying their own way
as far as the state was concerned. 53 The court had concluded that
the state by deducting corresponding federal dollars from state
aid was in substance intercepting federal aid dollars, diverting
them from impacted school districts to the state and thereby
placing the impacted district back where it had been before its
impact woes were remedied by the federal aid grant.
This conclusion flows from the court's tacit assumption that
the controlling object of the state's deduction provision was to
reimburse the state treasury for state expenses associated with
the federal presence. The court, to reach that conclusion, ignored
the fact that the state school aid allocation had been previously
increased to cover both the increased enrollment and the de-
creased tax base of the affected school district. 4 The court's as-
sumption may have been prompted by the misleading appear-
ance created by Virginia's practice of returning the money saved
by the deduction directly to the state's general revenue fund.
That the court's assumption regarding the purpose of the de-
duction is in fact false is clear from an inspection of the plan of
the state allocation formula. It was designed only to prevent
unnecessary and costly duplicate expenditures by the state and
was never intended to have the purpose or the effect of compen-
sating the state for its costs or of causing the substitution of
federal funds for state aid obligations."
(b) Federal Law
To support its conclusion that the intended effect of PL 874
was to supplement other local revenue the court cited first the
report of the House of Representatives' Labor and Education
Committee on the bill which became PL 874." The report stated
53. 280 F. Supp. at 873.
54. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
55. Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 719, item 459 (1966).
56. 280 F. Supp. at 874-75.
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that the aid contemplated by the act was not meant to provide
any compensation to the state, whose revenues, if anything, were
increased by the federal presence. This increase resulted both
from the secondary economic effects produced by the federal
presence and from the necessary increase in state tax revenues
from personal income, sales, excise, gasoline and other taxes. 7
The Shepheard court derived a major element of support for
its conclusion from the passage in 1966 of an amendment to
PL 874 (20 U.S.C. § 240) adding section 240 (d).5s The amendment
provided that the Commissioner of Education should, provided
no inequity to the local district would result, reduce the aid
payable to an impacted local district by the amount by which
the state reduced its aid to that district below the state appro-
priation of the second preceding year. Arguing that this amend-
ment directly supported its conclusion with respect to the in-
tended effect of PL 874, the court quoted the following para-
graph from the accompanying Committee report:
Fifteen States offset the amount of Public Law 874 funds re-
ceived by their school districts by reducing part of their State
aid to those districts. This is in direct contravention to con-
gressional intent. Impact aid funds are intended to compen-
sate districts for loss of tax revenues due to Federal connection,
not to substitute for state funds the districts would otherwise
receive.59
The last sentence quoted explains and at the same time
refutes the court's conclusion. Not only does the sentence re-
state the policy of PL 874 aid-to restore the financial equality
of the impacted district-it also explains what the Congress
thought the states were doing by deducting PL 874 funds. This
sentence must be read in context with the first two. Thus read,
they say, "By deducting PL 874 receipts from their own aid allo-
cations, states frustrate the congressional intent to compensate
impacted districts for lost taxes." But since neither in theory
nor in actual dollar effect6 ° does this result follow a state's de-
duction, it seems clear the Congress as well as the court failed
to appreciate the fact that the state formula had, prior to the
deduction, already accounted for the lost property taxes and in-
creased financial responsibilities of the impacted district. Had it
not, Congress would have been entirely correct-deduction from
a state aid allocation that had not been increased in response to
57. HLR. REP. No. 2287, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1950).
58. PL 89-750, 80 Stat. 1211 (1966).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1814, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1966) (emphasis by
the court).
60. Comment, 25 WAsH. & LEE L. Rsv. 237, 242 (1968).
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impact-associated burdens would indeed amount to an attempt
by the state to substitute federal funds for state funds the dis-
trict would otherwise receive. To contend that literally this
argument applies just as well to the state's impact aid con-
tribution refutes itself. It imputes to the Congress an intent to
compel those states whose school aid formulas are responsive
enough to local needs to cover impact-associated hardships to
duplicate, without recourse, federal payments directed to pre-
cisely the same problem. It imputes to the Congress a purpose
or policy of putting impacted districts, for the sole reason of
their being impacted, in a strikingly unequal position vis-a-
vis comparable unimpacted districts. This is precisely the oppo-
site of the actual federal policy as manifested in the statute.
This, however, is exactly the conclusion which the court reaches.
Earlier in the same report the now familiar language of the
actual policy was reaffirmed: "The purpose [of PL 874] is to
compensate local educational agencies for financial burdens im-
posed on them by Federal activities." '61 The report of the cor-
responding Senate committee is substantially identical in this
respect.6 2 An accurate understanding of the nature of the state
deduction would show that the deduction in no way interfered
with the benefit intended to be conferred by the federal act, nor
did it counter the policy or purpose of the federal aid.0 3
The state school aid formula did not use federal funds to
meet part of its supplementary aid obligation, reduce the state ef-
fort accordingly and thereby lessen the total amount of funds
available to the impacted district. The formula had already fully
accounted for all the federal children in the impacted district's
61. H.R. REP. No. 1814, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1966).
62. The purpose of the two laws is to compensate local edu-
cational agencies for financial burdens imposed on them by
Federal activities. The detailed provisions of Public Law 874
as originally enacted directed that school districts be compen-
sated for a portion of the yearly operational cost of educating
children living with a parent residing on or employed on Federal
property which was not subject to taxation for school purposes.
S. REP. No. 1674, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1966).
The author inquired of Rep. Albert Quie (R.-Minn.), a member of
the reporting Education and Labor Committee and one of the floor man-
agers of the 1966 amendment, as to the intended effect of PL 874 and
the new section 240 (d). He replied:
It was designed to provide local school districts with funds in
lieu of taxes which would have been generated on privately
owned property. I do not believe it was intended to provide
supplemental revenues above and beyond the provision of nor-
mal per pupil expenditures.
63. See Comment, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237 (1968).
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schools, 64 and had already fully allowed for and replaced the
lost property taxes., 5 Only then was the deduction taken. Since
there was no reason and certainly no justification for the im-
pacted district to enjoy a nearly double recovery, the state de-
cided to reduce proportionately a corresponding portion of its
assistance when the federal government acted to alleviate the
local financial distress. At first the amount so deducted was
100 percent of the PL 874 allottment. But it soon became ap-
parent to the state that the limitations built into the formula of
PL 874, coupled with the inherent imprecision of the state allo-
cation and deduction formulae, kept the correspondence of the
PL 874 grant and the state supplementary share from being
exact. Consequently, the state deduction was reduced to 50 per-
cent, then 33 1/3 percent, to prevent undue duplication of aid
without threatening underpayment through total reliance on the
possibly inadequate federal formula.60
2. Actual Dollar Effect
As a purely factual, dollars and cents, matter, the court was
wrong in its characterization of the effect of the state deduction.
Indeed, it appears that even under the state deduction formula,
which the court held to be "inadequate to continue [the pre-
impact educational expenditure] level for the increased school
attendance" 67 and to burden pro tanto the taxpayer-plaintiffs as
federal funds were "diverted," the impacted school districts of
Virginia were not only enjoying an average per pupil income
(from all sources and after the state deduction) higher than that
of non-impacted districts, but the taxpayers of these districts
were paying property taxes at a lower rate than taxpayers in
neighboring non-impacted districts. 8 This factual showing alone
refutes the contention acceded to by the court that the effect of
the state plan was to burden the local taxpayers and to deprive
their school children of equal educational opportunity. The state
deduction, which allowed a 50 percent and then a two-thirds du-
plication of the PL 874 dollars, had precisely the opposite effect.
Obviously, an impacted district received less money after
the deduction than it would have received without the deduc-
tion. But this is irrelevant to the issues involved. What must
64. Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 719, item 459 (1966).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 280 F. Supp. at 874.
68. Comment, 25 WAsH. & Lms. L. REv. 237 (1968).
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be determined, which the court failed to do, is whether the less-
ening of state aid, and the consequent reduction in the net
amount finally received by the impacted district, conflicts with
the manifest federal policy of creating or restoring a financial
parity in per pupil resources as compared with similar, non-im-
pacted school districts. The figures cited above prove conclu-
sively that the deduction formula in no way adversely affected
that policy. The contemplated equality was more than main-
tained by the state practice of deducting only a small fraction of
PL 874 aid from its own augmented allocation.
3. Summary
It can be seen that there was in fact no operational conflict
between the federal and Virginia legislation. The policy and
effect of the former was to compensate impacted districts for the
costs and other burdens imposed by the federal presence in the
district. The Virginia plan conflicted with neither the pol.cy
nor the effect. The two complemented one another in opera-
tion, to the benefit of the taxpayers who complained, because
the Virginia aid plan, as a whole, did not detract from the fed-
eral aid intended to be available to impacted local school districts.
Plaintiffs and the court looked only to one portion of the whole
state aid allocation formula,6 9 and even then failed to consider
the factual dollar effect of any portion or the entirety of the
state scheme on the federal scheme. Indeed the Shepheard court,
as did others, specifically refused to consider any factual proof
offered by the state, choosing to rest the decision on the theoreti-
cal or legal basis of the purpose and intendment of the federal
act.7 0 Neither of the conditions necessary to invoke the opera-
tional conflict aspect of the supremacy clause are present.
Were a state to take steps to deprive an impacted district of
the substantive compensatory effect of PL 874 aid, it is in-
disputable that a conflict of laws amounting to a violation of the
supremacy clause would exist. To that extent, and to that ex-
tent only, Congress, by enacting PL 874 has manifested clear in-
tent to preclude state action on the subject of the given legisla-
tion.
69. Specifically, the final deduction.
70. 280 F. Supp. at 874.
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D. APPLICATiON TO SUBSEQUENT CASES
The same considerations apply with equal force to the deci-
sions in the four subsequent cases since the respective state
school aid statutes, although flowing from somewhat different
bases and along different lines from Virginia's, are functionally
equivalent to Virginia's. When the percentage of PL 874 funds
receivable was deducted from each, it was deducted from an allo-
cation of state aid which had already been increased to reflect
the impacted district's lost local tax revenues and increased ob-
ligations. Since the authority cited in the later cases is Slzep-
heard v. Godwin, the showing of a lack of operational conflict in
Shepheard is equally applicable to the others.
In one instance, specific data is available to demonstrate
again that as a purely factual matter the basis of the court's
conclusion is as wrong as its misapprehension of the legislative
policy involved. The case is Jorgenson v. Douglas Independent
School District No. 3, involving the South Dakota state aid to
education statute.7'1  The question these figures answer is
whether the South Dakota deduction formula served to frustrate
in any degree the express congressional policy and intended ef-
fect of putting impacted school districts in a financial position
substantially equivalent to that of comparable, non-impacted
districts in the state. The following figures are based on the
school year 1966-67 and reflect the situation under the chal-
lenged deduction formula.
Douglas Independent is an all-urban district near Rapid
City in Pennington County in southwestern South Dakota. The
mill rate in the Douglas school district for the year 1966-67 was
27. The Pennington County average rate was 34, the statewide
average was 31.54 and the state median was 32.74. The Douglas
Independent cost per average daily attendance (the average
amount per child spent annually in the district) was $552.98, the
state average was $494.68 and the state median was $511.82.72
From these figures it is apparent that in Douglas Independent,
as in Virginia's impacted districts,73 the property owners of the
impacted district were paying taxes at a lower rate and getting
more education per child, measured by per pupil expenditures,
than were taxpayers in comparable non-impacted districts. Far
from harming them, pro tanto or otherwise, the South Dakota
71. 293 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.D. 1968) construing S.D. CoMpmrED LAws
ANN. §§ 13-13-11 et seq. (1967).
72. South Dakota Dept. of Educ., South Dakota School Statistics,
1966-67 (S.D. Research Bulletin 45.6, 1968).
73. Comment, 25 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 237 (1968).
1970]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
deduction formula, by deducting only half of a district's PL 874
allocation, left a 50 percent overlap, preserving a substantial
benefit to taxpayers and their children.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES
A. VIRGINIA'S "PLAN B"
The practical result of these holdings is that the states are
unable to prevent a nearly double repayment of impact-caused
expenses and losses by means of a deduction from state funds
keyed to the amount of PL 874 aid receivable by the impacted
district. Apparently Virginia had anticipated the possibility of
this outcome and provided for it with a contingency plan.7' Un-
der this plan it was provided that if the deduction formula should
be declared unconstitutional, the double recovery of the local
district would be avoided by the state's not paying the impacted
district for conceptually half of the impact handicap: no payment
would be made out of state funds for the cost of educating chil-
dren whose parents resided or were employed on tax-exempt fed-
eral property. State supplementary aid would continue to
reimburse the impacted district in full for lost property tax
revenue. It was contemplated that the continued receipt of the
entire PL 874 aid allocation would cover fully any excess direct
cost of educating the federal children not met by reason of limit-
ing the state aid to restoration of the lost local tax revenues. It
was expected that this allocation of funds would leave the im-
pacted district with approximately the same financial resources
per pupil as it had enjoyed prior to the impact.
Although a superficial examination produces the impression
of discrimination in the state's refusal to help pay for some of
the federal children on the sole basis of their being federal chil-
dren, nevertheless, the state plan would have affected neither
the impacted district's receipt of state aid to replace lost tax reve-
nues nor its receipt of PL 874 aid to pay the cost of educating
the federal children. In actuality the plan discriminated against
the affected children only to the extent that it refused to dupli-
cate with substantially identical state payments the fixed amount
of per pupil payments made under PL 874. Nor did this plan
result in a dilution of the intended federal aid. PL 874 was de-
signed to indemnify an impacted district for its federally caused
economic hardships. PL 874's effectuality was never thought to
74. Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 719, item 459 (1966).
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depend on parallel state payments. Thus the fact that Virginia
voluntarily paid only half the cost-covering lost taxes-but re-
fused to pay the other half of the impact burdens-the cost of
educating federal children-should be wholly irrelevant to the
efficacy of PL 874 aid in the impacted district. If PL 874 aid,
because of this state reduction in aid, falls short of full satisfac-
tion of its announced goal, the fault cannot be chargeable to the
state aid formula.
Nevertheless, the contingency plan was challenged by the
plaintiffs in Shepheard under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 75 Their theory was that the contingency
plan drew a discriminatory classification detrimental to federal
children for no permissible or education related reason. The
court agreed, concluding that enforcement of the plan would
amount to a discrimination without any justification against fed-
eral children in the allocation of state money and was therefore
unconstitutional."0
B. THE 1968 AMMENT TO PL 874
The second result of Shepheard was the passage of an amend-
ment in 1968 which added a new subsection to PL 874.77 This
section provides that no payments may be made to an impacted
district in any year in which that district's state has considered
PL 874 aid in determining the eligibility of the local district for
state aid, or in determining the amount of such state aid in that
or the preceding year, or which in any way diminishes on ac-
count of PL 874 the amount of aid to an impacted local district
below what the district would otherwise receive from the state.7 8
The committee report on the bill which added this new section
said tersely, "The committee is recommending this amendment at
this time in order to implement a decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as a three-judge
court."7 9 The committee reported no further substantive consid-
eration of the amendment. This is not surprising since the
amendment appears reasonable on its face. Its effect is to codify
Shepheard, but this adds nothing to the inquiry into congres-
sional intent since it was illustrated earlier" that Congress mis-
75. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, cL 1.
76. 280 F. Supp. at 875.
77. 20 U.S.C. § 240(d) (2) (Supp. 1969), and renumbering the former
§ 240(d) to § 240(d) (1). PL 90-576, 82 Stat. 1097 (1968).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2) (Supp. 1969).
79. S. REP. No. 1386, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1968).
80. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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understood the nature of the state deduction formulae it had
condemned in 1966. Further, it was just that expression of in-
tent that the Shepheard court seized upon and which the 90th
Congress then passed into law.
This amendment was passed carelessly. There is no record
of its having been given any serious independent consideration
either in committee or on the floor of either House. In light of
the underlying policy of equality and parity of PL 874, this
amendment, which can serve only to produce or aggravate actual
inequality and disparity as between impacted and non-impacted
districts, is quite inexplicable. If the Congress means to effect
such a fundamental alteration in the policy and purpose of the
impacted area aid law, it should do so intentionally and con-
sciously. Otherwise, the amendment should be repealed forth-
with.
Ironically, the Shepheard court, before stating its order dis-
posing of the case, observed that what it was seeking to accom-
plish by its holding was to preclude Virginia ". . . from here-
after in any way denying to the impacted area the exclusive use
and enjoyment of the impact funds.""' The court failed to
understand that that was precisely the situation that had pre-
vailed in Virginia prior to the Shepheard suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate result of these cases is that states now must
choose between allowing their impacted districts to benefit by
receiving a double recovery of their impact burdens, or to provide
only a single recovery entirely out of state funds. Since it is
rather unlikely that a state will choose to pay by itself the entire
cost of the federally caused impact burdens when virtually
identical federal aid to the same end is available, states in all
likelihood will opt to comply with Shepheard and section 240 (d)
(2), reasoning that as long as they will have to pay these impact
costs once, it might as well be done in such a way as to bring a
considerable amount of federal aid to the district at the same
time.
Yet this result, which is the practical outcome of Shep-
heard, produces two constitutionally unacceptable conditions,
each of which seems to violate the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. The first is produced by the state mak-
ing an affirmative choice to allow considerable benefit to be
81. 280 F. Supp. at 875.
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conferred on a class of people defined by the sole criterion of
their residence. Benefits can no more be bestowed arbitrarily,
here geographically, than can a discriminatory disability be im-
posed on a like basis within the ambit of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 2 The other problem lies
in the area of the emerging claim of a fourteenth amendment
right of equal access to educational opportunity. The phrase
has yet to take on much substantive content,8 3 but it must at
least include the concept that where the state undertakes to pro-
vide free public education to all children, it may not arbitrarily
cause a considerably lesser or greater educational opportunity,
measured by dollar expenditures, to be provided to a class de-
fined by strictly geographical terms which have no rational re-
lation to a permissible educational object, than it provides to
all children.
Consideration of these equal protection issues in any greater
detail is beyond the scope of this Note-they are mentioned only
to suggest the incongruity of the result compelled by the Shep-
heard decision and section 240 (d) (2). That the state's choice of
the double compensation alternative is the necessary one is clear
since the district courts surely did not intend to compel the only
other choice, that of declining to participate at all in the bene-
ficial scheme of PL 874.
Indeed, the incongruity and contradiction produced by the
Shepheard holding, in the light of an accurate understanding of
the nature and effect of the state school aid allocation statutes
and the policy behind the federal act, are themselves the source
of a strong inference that Shepheard's reading of the legislative
intent of PL 874 was defective. Such a result as that produced
should not be imputed to the Congress without a far more com-
prehensive, not to say convincing, exposition of that intent from
the act and its accompanying historical materials than was made
in Shepheard v. Godwin.
82. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 31 (1889)
(certain members of a class may not be given special privileges); accord,
Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967) (government
action may not award unequal benefits or impose unequal burdens);
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33 (1921) (equal protection bars
undue favor and privilege as well as hostile discrimination).
83. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Hobson v.
Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.).C. 1967). But see McInnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IlL 1968) (otherwise valid state classification or
program not rendered unconstitutional because some economic disparity
results). See also Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv.
583 (1968).
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